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“… capitalism is not a system given to stasis. What works in one period is unlikely to work 
in the next; and even when it ‘works’, its distribution of costs and benefits is never socially 
equal. So when deciding which tiger to ride, it is worth remembering that the choice is only 
between tigers, and that if a safe ride is what you want, you would do well not to ride tigers 
at all”.   (Coates, 2007; 193). 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The economic history of the last half century indicates that whereas industrial policy has been highly 
successful in some countries, it has been equally unsuccessful in others.  The African countries would 
wish to draw appropriate lessons from both sets of countries.  As latecomers to industrialization, the 
African countries are well placed to carry out such an exercise. This paper explores potential 
industrial policy ‘lessons’ for small African countries (both negative and positive) from the 
experience of other Ireland.  
 
                                       
1 From a poem by William Blake (1757–1827).  
2 Lenihan is based at the Department of Economics, Kemmy Business School, University of Limerick, Ireland. 
She worked on this paper during her sabbatical leave as a Visiting Fellow at the CBR at Judge Business School, 
University of Cambridge and concurrently a Visiting Fellow at Wolfson College, University of Cambridge UK 
and finally as a visiting academic at the CSME, Warwick Business School, University of Warwick, UK.   Bailey 
is Professor of International Business Strategy and Economics at Coventry University Business School, UK.  
Singh is Emeritus Professor of Economics, University of Cambridge and Director of Research with CERF at 
the Judge Business School in Cambridge. 
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There is, however, a prior question which they obviously need to consider.  Should they have an 
industrial policy at all?  Looking at the experience of the East and South East Asian countries 
indicates that industrial policy has played a key role in the extraordinary success of these economies 
in recent decades.3  In addition to this there is another related and powerful reason for African 
countries to examine closely the experience of Asian countries.  Many countries in the two regions at 
the time of independence from colonial rule had broadly similar economic structures and income 
levels. To illustrate, in the 1950s around the time of the country’s independence, Malaysia’s economy 
was much like that of Ghana, based on exports of primary agricultural commodities, rubber in the 
case of Malayasia and cocoa in relation to Ghana. Both countries shared the common legacy of 
British colonial rule.  However, today, the Malayasian per capita income is nearly US $5000 at current 
exchange rates and US $10,000 at PPP rates, while the Ghanian per capita income has risen very little 
over the same period. It is legitimate to ask how can one account for such a difference in the 
evolution of the two economies? Was it, for example, simply due to the fact that the Ghanian 
economy was subject to greater economic shocks than Malaysia’s? There is little empirical support 
for this hypothesis. Moreover, a large number of other East and South Asian countries also did very 
well using industrial policy and outperformed most African countries. For these reasons comparisons 
of African countries with East and South Asian countries are commonly made and are often useful.  
However, in this paper we instead give detailed attention to Ireland as a comparator. 
 
Close attention to the Irish case does not of course imply that other countries’ experiences are not 
significant or relevant, but we believe that Ireland’s experience with industrial policy does have useful 
and significant implications for Africa, and that this has been overlooked thus far.  Nevertheless, for 
African countries, at a practical policy level, we would like to note a point of caution. As Aginger 
(2007) notes, ‘industrial policy is one of the most controversial policy fields.  Its scope, instruments 
and rationale vary across countries, changing over time; intentions and outcomes often differ’ (p. 
143). 
 
The following sections will discuss in detail the political economy of development in Africa, the need 
to view industrial policy in a broad sense, taking a holistic approach, before detailing the role of 
industrial policy and other important factors in the development of the Irish economy, together with 
the lessons for African countries. In so doing, we make reference to East Asian countries where such 
comparisons are useful in highlighting particular points. 
 
                                       
3 Amsden (1989) and Wade (1990) are two well known representative studies from the huge literature on this 
subject. 
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Why is Ireland a useful reference point for small African states? 
 
There are, in fact, a number of reasons for using Ireland as an interesting reference point. Firstly, 
when Ireland joined the then ‘Common Market’ in 1973, the economy was in many senses a small, 
poor, peripheral and agriculturally dominated economy with an overdependence on links to its 
former colonial master, the UK. Trade was limited given ongoing protectionism (the European 
Union (EU) in particular had yet to fully open up). In under three decades, however, the Irish 
economy has transformed itself from being one of the four cohesion countries of the EU to being 
considered an advanced high-tech enclave of the EU. 
 
In addition, Ireland, like most African countries is a small economy. It has the geographical size of 
Sierra Leone as well as a similar population. Given its small size, clearly the membership of the EU 
has played a major role in the evolution of the Irish success story. Apart from providing a far bigger 
market for Irish products so as to be able to reap the economies of scale, EU has also provided 
Ireland with very large direct assistance for the development of its infrastructure. What could take the 
place of EU even in a limited sense in the present context of small African countries? This issue will 
be taken up in this paper.  
 
Furthermore, although Ireland is far from being a laissez-faire economy it is by no means as ‘dirigiste’ 
as the East and the South Asian countries. It is more corporatist than the East Asian countries. The 
unions play a major role in the determination of wages and prices. Compared with the East Asian 
model it is therefore more likely to be directly relevant to the African countries. The East and South 
Asian pattern of development is heavily dependant on the outstanding qualities of the civil service. 
Such qualities are not simply inherited but are developed alongside the expansion of the economy 
(see Chang, 2006). Nevertheless, the corporatist model makes comparatively less demands on 
administrative capacity. 
 
It can also be argued that African countries potentially have more to learn from the experience of the 
operation of industrial policies in Ireland than in the East and South Asian countries. Irish industrial 
policy did not involve measures of coercion in the allocation of resources in the way it did in the case 
of East Asian countries during the prime of their industrial policy, for example, Japan between 1950 
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to 1973, and Korea between 1970 to 19904. It will be recalled that in Japan during this period the 
government used the allocation of foreign exchange in coercive ways as a principal weapon to meet 
government’s targets for specific firms and industries. Similarly in Korea during its main industrial 
policy period, there is evidence of coercion in the expansion and upgrading of country’s exports by 
the large conglomerates which the government itself had created (see Amsden (1989,1994), Amsden 
and Singh (1994), Singh (1995,1998), Chang (2006)). It should not be forgotten that during the 
operation of industrial policy in a number of East Asian countries, industrial ‘peace’ was ensured 
through the suppression of trade union rights. Some would argue that this alone makes the Irish 
example suitable as a role model for African countries. 
 
Finally, the development of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) - given their importance in 
both Ireland and small African states – suggests as well that Ireland can regarded as a worthwhile 
case study. Of particular relevance here, certain characteristics of Irish SMEs can be noted: 
(1) Irish SMEs were focussed primarily upon the home market. Indeed, export oriented SMEs 
were an uncommon occurrence in the Ireland of the 1970s.  
(2) Ireland’s small manufacturing firms in the past were mostly found in traditional industries 
such as food, beverages and tobacco, textiles and wood products.  These industries were 
characterised by low productivity, skills and research and development (R&D).    
(3) Small firms in Ireland were then faced with similar barriers as small firms in Africa today 
(albeit on a different scale), namely financial barriers (particularly at the business start-up 
stage), poor macroeconomic conditions, and a poor business environment.   
 
On the latter point, several studies on the barriers encountered by small firms in Ireland have 
pointed to access to finance as being the single most critical issue (Forfás 1994; Goodbody 
Economic Consultants 2002; Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2001).  Very recent work on the 
Irish case shows that small businesses continue to experience difficulties in obtaining appropriate 
levels of finance for start-up and growth (Small Business Forum, 2006).  This finding has been 
reiterated in recent work with regard to small firms in Africa (see below).  
 
Until recently, there has also been no well–defined, structured or focused policy for support of 
SMEs in Ireland. As we shall see below, industrial policy in Ireland has mostly been geared towards 
FDI and it could reasonably be argued that this has been at the expense of indigenous companies.  
                                       
4 These were the high growth periods for the two countries. In 1973 Japan was still more like a developing 
country than it has been since. See further Singh (1995). 
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This has some similarities to Africa, where an adverse business environment (with little support from 
government agencies, the regulatory offices and the managers of state enterprises) is an additional 
impediment for small firms.   
 
Despite these apparent similarities, one key aspect missing in the African case is the benefit of 
European integration in the form of the single market. When Ireland joined the Common Market, 
there were a lacuna of developed common policies outside the Common Agricultural Policy (which 
at the time absorbed three quarters of the EC budget). Over time, though, there have been two 
major ways in which EU economic integration has brought substantial opportunities for small firms: 
(i) through the Acquis Communautaire and (ii) through the benefits emanating from structural funding, 
particularly in the sphere of infrastructural development. The latter has brought significant benefit to 
Ireland.  Beyond the costs associated with the Acquis, it can generate many advantages to small firms 
in the medium to long run.  These firms will be able to benefit from the entire (completed) internal 
market of about 450 million consumers.   The Single Market and deregulation in the EU will also 
ameliorate cross border trade by small firms engaging in flexible specialisation. The Single Market 
can also be helpful in attracting market-seeking FDI, an element which is very much missing from 
the African case. 
 
From its post Second World War beginnings in the European coal and steel community, the EU has 
evolved into an integrated single market of 450 million people. Many of its member states have also 
adopted a common currency and a common monetary policy together with many other measures of 
deep political integration. Such far reaching integration is clearly beyond the capacities of SSA 
countries. However, there are substantial benefits, economic as well as political, even from the 
limited regional integration which some countries have attempted. There are also a few reasonably 
well functioning examples of integration in African countries, notably in Southern Africa. The 
emphasis in the more successful of these late integration projects has been less on trade integration 
but more on integration of transport as well as in other spheres of infrastructure. Over time these 
countries may be able to cooperate on monetary matters as well as on trade and investment. The 
possibilities of African economies to be able to benefit from the kind of assistance which Ireland 
received from the EU may not appear to be a practical proposition for African countries.  Yet it may 
not be entirely fanciful.  Who is to say that to acknowledge the contribution of Afro-Americans to 
building up modern United States, let alone to right the historic wrongs, a President Obama may not 
launch the equivalent of a Marshall Plan for African countries?  Such a plan should encourage 
regional integration on the E.U. pattern, leading ultimately to deep integration.  Even if such a grand 
vision does not materialise, the essential point is that ODA to African countries should be used to 
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encourage regional integration to create a larger market for firms in participating countries as well as 
to provide funding for the development of regional infrastructure.  
 
 
The Political Economy of African Development  
 
The African economies, particularly those in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) stand today at an important 
crossroads. During the 1980s, for the average African country, GDP per capita fell at a rate of 0.5 
percent per annum; in the 1990s it rose slightly at a rate of 0.3 percent per annum (see Table-1). 
However, in the last four years, the average growth rate of this variable has been a respectable 3 
percent per annum. In 2007, GDP growth rate in Africa was estimated to be 6 percent per annum, 
one of the highest rates recorded during any year over the last quarter century. Apart from indicating 
the recent recovery in African economic growth, the table also highlights the poor long term 
performance of the African economies relative to other developing countries. Over the entire 26 year 
period, 1981-2007, for which the data are presented in the table, per capita GDP in African countries 
rose only by 16 per cent. compared with more than a 100 per cent. rise for all developing countries. 
For the East and South Asian economies, the growth in GDP per capita has been spectacular, a rise 
of well over 300 per cent. 
 
Table 1:  
PER CAPITA GDP GROWTH BY REGION AND ECONOMIC GROUPING, 1981-2007 
(Per Cent) 
       Average annual   Overall 
     Growth    Growth 
    _______________________    ______________________ 
    1981- 1990-   2003-    1981- 
    1989    2002     2007              2007 
 
World    1.4 1.2 2.3    41.4 
 
Developed economies  2.5 1.8 2.1    67.5 
 
Economies in transition  1.9 -4.0 7.3   -25.8 
 
Developing economies  1.7 3.0 5.0            112.5 
Of which: 
 
 Africa   -0.5 0.3 3.0     16.4 
 America -0.3 1.1 3.5     22.7 
 West Asia  -1.7 1.1 4.1     16.0 
 East and South Asia  5.1 5.3 6.3               317.5 
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Source:  UNCTAD (2007). 
 
It is very much a moot point whether this recent reversal of fortunes for the African countries has 
been due to the late success of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) of the World Bank and the 
IMF, as is implicitly claimed by the two Bretton Woods institutions [World Bank (2007), IMF 
(2008)]. These programmes, which have been the dominant influences on Sub Saharan African 
economies during much of 1980s and all of 1990s, have embodied the Washington Consensus and its 
aftermath. According to independent economists [UNCTAD (2005), and (2007), ILO (2007), 
Mickenley (2005) and Lall (2005)], although many countries implemented these programmes, there 
has not been much success in enhancing their economic growth on a sustained basis. Indeed 
Thandika Mkandawire (2005), a leading scholar of African economies argues persuasively that the 
SAPs were in fact counterproductive and often led to the wrong kind of structural change which 
would hinder rather than help economic development. 
 
The most plausible reason for the fast growth of African economies in the last four years would 
appear to be the huge increase in international commodity prices. Information provided by 
UNCTAD (2007) reveals how the prices of various commodities have changed over this period: 
 
Table 2: World Primary Commodity Prices, 2002-2006 (Percentage Change) 
 
Commodity group      2002-2006 
Food and Tropical Beverages          48.4 
Agricultural raw materials          62.3 
Minerals,ores and metals        219.9 
Crude petroleum        157.6 
 
Source: UNCTAD Secretariat calculations, based on UNCTAD Commodity Price Bulletin, various 
issues, and UNSD, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, various issues.  Adapted from UNCTAD (2007). 
 
The increased value of SSA exports as a result of the commodity price rise helped to relax the 
balance of payments constraint which in turn led to faster growth. The central issue is whether or not 
the African countries can translate this recent improved performance into sustained, fast, long term 
economic growth. Here the economic history of these countries in the last half century does not 
provide much ground for optimism. The good record of African economic growth between 1950 
Bailey, Lenihan and Singh pre-publication version for Noman et al volume 2011 
 8 
and 1973 when these economies expanded at a rate of nearly 5 per cent. per annum could not 
subsequently be sustained. Similarly, during the 1990s a number of countries were successively 
selected as the ‘African success stories’ by the Bretton Woods institutions, none of which could 
actually maintain fast growth for more than 2-3 years (Mkandawire, 2005). Such economic history 
invites scepticism about the ability of African countries to convert their recent favourable changes in 
the terms of trade into lasting progress. The case of the sceptics is straightforward. Apart from all the 
other handicaps, the African countries have been further debilitated by two decades of stagnation or 
worse; and are therefore unlikely to achieve fast long term growth. 
 
There are however important counter arguments which are equally an essential part of the story. The 
African countries are today much better equipped for initiating and sustaining fast growth, with a far 
greater endowment of human and material resources than they were 25 years ago. 
 The educational level of Africa’s citizens is much higher today than it was in the early 
1970s. This is particularly notable at the tertiary level. There were for example only 7 
university graduates in Tanzania in 1964 at the time of the country’s independence from 
British colonial rule. Today, after independence there are literally thousands, as a result of 
the establishment of the University of Dar-e-Salam, a splendid institution of higher 
education.  
 There is a network of science and research institutions, engineering colleges, throughout the 
continent. A number of business schools have also been established and there is close 
collaboration between the African and the best business schools in the US and the UK 
(Pfeffermann, 2008). 
 There are signs of an emerging middle class in the African countries. There is evidence also 
of the evolution of entrepreneurship in these countries (ibid.). 
 Moreover, as The Economist (2008) notes, “an unexpected and overlooked continent may 
benefit from its very isolation” (p.33).  It suggests by way of illustration that African banks 
are normally regarded as being very conservative and excessively regulated.  ‘Now, however’ 
observes The Economist (2008), “this very de-linkage from the Western financial system 
has turned out to Africa’s advantage.  It’s banks have almost no exposure to the sub-prime 
market causing such havoc elsewhere…” (p.33). 
 
Viewing Development in the Round: The need for a Holistic Approach to Policy 
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Commonly adopted definitions of industrial policy are too narrow where the key focus, particularly 
in the past, has been simply on providing grant aid to firms and intervention with respect to 
particular sectors, even with a more recent focus on policies focused directly at the promotion of 
R&D and innovation and/or FDI and SMEs.  We argue that good practice industrial policy is in fact 
much more ‘holistic’ in its approach and focuses simultaneously on both demand and supply side 
factors of industrial development; on micro economics as well as macro economics.5   Such an 
approach is in line with that suggested by the ‘Culliton Report’ (1992) in the context of Irish 
industrial policy. Culliton (1992) emphasised provision of infrastructural needs; reform of the tax 
system; a re-focusing of the education and training system; increased funding for science and 
technology (coupled with greater involvement by industry in steering the use of these funds); and a 
greater emphasis on technology acquisition. In so doing, the report stressed that the role of the 
industrial promotion agencies should be kept under review, and the desirability of fostering clusters 
of related industries building on ‘leverage points’ of national advantage was also highlighted.  
 
As for indigenous industry, Culliton saw the widespread existence of grants as being often 
counterproductive (the argument being that it encourages a hand-out mentality). In this vein, more 
emphasis should be placed on: the increased use of equity finance as opposed to non-repayable cash 
grants; an emphasis on the need for the expansion of the indigenous sector; a reorganisation of grant 
awarding agencies into two main agencies, one of which would address the needs of foreign-owned 
industries, the other the needs of indigenous ones.  Culliton was also at pains to stress that the Irish 
Department of Industry and Commerce was overly focused on operational matters and needed to 
place industrial policy formulation and evaluation at the centre of its activities.  We argue that a ‘good 
practice’ definition of industrial policy includes all of these but also needs to emphasise other factors 
such as well functioning labour and credit markets, an appropriate macro-environment, and attempts 
to build consensus over appropriate policy direction.   
 
We broadly agree with Hitchens and Birnie (1992) in their commentary on evaluating the Culliton 
report that the real challenge is to try to weigh the importance of the above factors with regard to the 
overall ‘competitiveness problem’ (we would however be more inclined to see this as the industrial or 
                                       
5 Singh (1995) comments on the inter-relationship between industrial policy and macro economic stability with 
particular reference to the experience of East Asian countries. To the extent that industrial policy was effective 
in Japan or the Republic of Korea in relieving the balance of payments constraint, it will also have aided 
macroeconomic stability.  A current account balance at the desired growth rate can help to avoid the stop-go 
cycles which many economies experience.  This, in turn, will lower the cost of capital since for a given savings 
rate in the economy, other things being equal, the more variable and unstable the economic performance, the 
higher the interest rate.  Similarly, faster economic growth also leads to faster growth of real wages, and hence 
enhances social stability and the political legitimacy of the socio-economic order.  Thus, macroeconomic 
stabilization and industrial policy interact with each other in a virtuous circle of cumulative causation. 
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economic development challenge).  With reference to improving competitiveness (or in our case 
industrial or economic development) the authors correctly point out that there is little point calling 
for the need to improve competitiveness “…without any satisfactory definition that can be 
operationalised” (p. 29).  They proceed to argue that “this lack of identification of its causes and 
hence effective solutions is an impediment to a satisfactory industrial development policy” (ibid).  
Therein of course lays the challenge for policymakers regardless of country.   
 
Thinking back to Ireland’s less favourable times, the preface to the Culliton report (1992) opens its 
narrative with the following comment: “over the past six months we have considered industrial 
policy bearing in mind the 260,000 people who are unemployed. We have concluded that there are 
no short term solutions, no quick fixes and no soft options left” (p. 7). In addition, it notes; 
“Ireland’s economic problems are deep-rooted and persistent. Their resolution will require patience, 
determination and a fundamental re-appraisal of our strengths and weaknesses” (p. 7). 
 
Following on from this broad and holistic view of what industrial policy should comprise, in the Irish 
case we can identify a range of factors which played a significant part in Ireland’s recent ‘catch up’.  
These include: 
(1) Currency devaluations in both 1986 and 1993 which were then locked into the single 
currency; the Euro’s post-2000 depreciation in turn benefited outward orientated states such 
as Ireland;  
(2) A series of corporatist social pacts from 1987 where trade unions limited wage increases in 
return for income tax cuts. These have allowed rapid growth without inflation rising too 
high and have also enabled rapid employment growth; 
(3) A rapid expansion in labour supply, in part through net in-migration.6 More widely, the 
demographic shifts Ireland has experienced are unique within the EU, with an even balance 
between natural growth and migration (Salt 2005: 49)7; 
(4) An interventionist industrial policy which has targeted certain sectors for FDI but has also 
recognised the limitations of FDI-based growth and somewhat belatedly has sought to 
better link foreign plants with domestic firms and has also tried to develop indigenous 
capabilities and improvements in entrepreneurship, labour skills and research and 
development. 
                                       
6 Ireland has the highest fertility rate in the EU, and between 1981 and 2001 experienced a population increase 
of 15 per cent, from 3.5 million to just over 4 million in 2004 (NESC 2005: 1).   
7 UNCTAD (2007; 25) notes that monetary or non-monetary resource transfers by migrants to their home 
countries are increasingly recognized as an important source of financing for development in Africa, being the 
second largest source of development capital flows to developing countries.  
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This analysis has implications for the design of industrial and other policies in other small, open and 
peripheral economies. We suggest that whilst important lessons may be learned, they may not be 
those picked up by mainstream commentators such as Sapir et al (2003).  Furthermore, it should be 
noted that a range of factors came together: some more by luck than by judgement, and that the Irish 
catch-up should have happened much earlier had it not been for previous policy mistakes, 
particularly at the macro-level (Bailey et al, 2007). 
 
Indeed, on the macroeconomic-side, stabilisation was an important part of finally ‘getting things 
right’ in Ireland. By the mid-1980s, the fiscal deficit in Ireland had grown to over 12% of GDP and 
the public debt ratio was approaching 120%.  The recognition of the need to address these 
imbalances led to both the social pacts after 1986 and a process of fiscal consolidation achieved by 
the government reducing expenditure; over the two year period 1988-1989, the ratio of expenditure 
to GDP was reduced by 9% (see Bailey et al, 2007). The pain of this adjustment was eased both by 
EU funding and an improved external environment with reduced interest rates and improving 
demand (Lynch, 2005).8 Of key relevance, the impact of EU structural funding assistance starting in 
1988 should not be underestimated: one study suggests that the cumulative effects of funding may 
have been to raise the level of GDP by over 4 per cent (Schweiger and Wickham, 2005: 50). Another 
suggests at least approximately 0.5 of a percentage point to GNP growth during the 1990s (Barry et 
al, 2001: 549). In other words, external funding gave Ireland just enough room to stabilise its 
economy and to make investments (especially in infrastructure) designed to boost competitiveness; 
this may be relevant for African economies in the context of overseas development assistance.  
Similarly, in the Africa case, UNCTAD (2005; 34) notes that overseas development assistance (ODA) 
could trigger such a “growth process if it is focused on financing pro-growth public investment such 
as economic infrastructure”. 
 
In addition, in the Irish case, currency depreciations which took place in 1986 and 1993 assisted Irish 
competitiveness; the latter in particular was a 10% depreciation which was then locked into Euro 
entry. Whilst there was a revaluation of the Punt before Euro entry in 1998, the depreciation of the 
Euro after its launch delivered a further 20% boost to Irish competitiveness given its external-
                                       
8 Quite why the Irish economy prospered at this time when the state pursued a very restrictive fiscal policy has 
been the subject of much debate. The European Commission saw it as an "expansionary fiscal contraction" 
which led to improved confidence and greater consumption and investments (EC Commission 1991; McAleese 
1990). Others have stressed the Lawson boom in Britain which raised demand for Irish products and fall of the 
oil-prices; "Irish policy makers were just lucky that their adjustment was carried out at a time when world 
growth became buoyant and world interest rates were falling" (Bradley et al. 1993). Kennedy (2001: 131-2) also 
suggests that growth in the US economy and the advent of the Single Market after 1993 were important factors. 
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orientation in trade towards non-Euro zone economies. That this did not feed through into higher 
inflation is in part due to the corporatist social pacts.  
 
Such corporatism has been a long-standing central feature of Irish economic policy, with the 
establishment of the National Economic and Social Council (NESC) in 1973. As noted, by the early 
1980s, Ireland faced a ‘crisis’ as the government had embarked on deficit-financed expenditure 
programmes after the oil price rise of the early 1980s (and indeed the early 1970s). The existing 
development strategy based on attracting FDI was also criticised for its failure to support domestic 
industry (Telesis, 1982; Culliton, 1992).  Trans-nationals responded to the crisis by cutting investment 
and repatriating profits, contributing to a deficit on the balance of payments amounting to around 
10% of GNP. Meanwhile, unemployment rose to around 20% of the labour force.  
 
At this crisis point, the major political parties recognised that an expansionary fiscal policy was no 
longer an option for Ireland as a small open economy. A social consensus for change emerged.  Key 
to this was the proposal by the trade unions in 1984 for a coordinated approach involving restrictive 
income policies, or ‘partnership agreements’. Indeed, Kennedy (2001: 135) argued that without 
partnership agreements, it is unlikely that unions would have tolerated a rise in the profit share of 
national income (see below). Developing a shared view of what needs to be done certainly seems to 
have been a key element in enabling the Irish catch-up.9   
 
Between 1988 and 2005 there were six social partnership agreements between government, unions 
and employers. The original programme was the Programme for National Recovery (PNR) which ran 
from 1987 to 1990.10 The PNR set out a strategy to raise competitiveness with four main 
components, which have been retained and developed over time in each of the subsequent 
partnership agreements with later agreements having broader coverage (including chapters on greater 
social inclusion, equality, enterprise culture, small business, agriculture, public service modernisation 
of and a commitment to support partnership at the enterprise level): 
                                       
9 MITI (the Ministry of International Trade and Industry) in Japan may have played a similar consensus-
building role after the Second World War through to the 1980s (see Bailey and Sugden, 2007). 
10 The pattern applied in the PNR was followed in successive pacts. An NESC report evaluates past experience 
and lessons, and provides a focal point for negotiations. Social pacts provide a mechanism for monitoring 
implementation and evaluation of the programmes. The Central Review Committee (CRC) was established in 
the PNR for this purpose, and includes representatives of the Government and the social partners. The CRC is 
supplemented by working groups as well as informal contacts between government and the social partners. 
Successive social pacts have broadened stakeholders involved in the negotiation as well as the focus of 
agreements. 
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 A commitment to reduce the level of public debt and maintain the internal and external 
stability of the Irish currency. This has focused on creating low inflation and interest rates 
and a positive climate for investors. From the mid 1990s onwards this has tied into the EU’s 
Maastricht Criteria and Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). 
 Restraining wage rises in order to improve cost competitiveness. An incomes policy became 
an essential part of the ‘new development strategy’. Through the pacts the government has 
compensated for wage restraint by lowering income taxes, although recently this has perhaps 
reached the limits of what is achievable. 
 To boost competitiveness, the pacts have included structural reforms in several areas such as 
industrial policy and taxation. The latter was seen as needing reform to encourage 
employment creation, being seen as biased towards capital and property. 
 Social justice has been seen as important and there have been improvements in welfare 
payments for the least well-off. 
 
The Irish experience, then, would suggest the importance of strong institutional arrangements in 
fostering sound economic performance and social cohesion around development objectives.  In 
addition to this, as Andreosso-O’Callaghan and Lenihan (2006) detail, a range of other factors came 
together to enable Ireland to catch up with other European economies, including: 
 A modern telecommunications network: Progression towards a modern telecommunications 
network was significantly helped by the decrease in telecommunications costs which 
subsequently reduced the real costs associated with firm location in a peripheral economy 
such as Ireland.  
 Human capital accumulation: In contrast to other peripheral host countries for foreign 
investment, Ireland had a relatively skilled (and English speaking) labour force. Yet it is 
worth noting that rapid economic growth in Ireland has taken place without much 
investment in innovation. By EU and international standards, and in spite of its relative 
current wealth, Ireland still suffers from a low R&D to GDP ratio (and/or R&D/GNP 
ratio). In contrast with one of the key lessons advocated by mainstream commentators, 
modern economic growth in Ireland does not owe much to innovation.  
 Competition policy and deregulation: The introduction of competition policy and 
deregulation in the early 1990s was important in terms of delivering on cost competitiveness 
for firms using Ireland as an export platform (see Braunerhjelm et al., 2000).  
 A shift in the type of products being traded internationally: Geographical disadvantage may 
not count as heavily anymore. As Krugman outlined: “…changes in both the nature of what 
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nations trade and in how they carry out that trade has shifted the balance of geographical 
advantage in a way that is favourable to Ireland” (Krugman 1997, 44).  
 
In referring to this well-trodden ground regarding the Irish growth factors, we simply wish to 
highlight that there were many factors which contributed to the success of the Irish economy 
particularly from around 1994 onwards. The industrial policy approach adopted by the Irish 
government was only one feature in the myriad of factors which contributed to the Irish success 
story. Almost all of the factors alluded to above would have impacted to a very large extent on the 
Irish business environment at the time. We would still suggest (see below) that there may be potential 
for government intervention in the SME sector in small economies such as those in sub-Saharan 
Africa to lead to significant improvements in the key growth indicators of these countries.  
 
Using Foreign Direct Investment - and involvement - intelligently 
 
It is recognised that foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to Africa, although increasing, are “still 
too limited in geographical coverage and focused on extractive industries to have a significant effect 
on employment creation and poverty alleviation” (UNCTAD, 2007; 1).  A key cause of this is the 
high degree of risk and poor business environment, which deters FDI. According to UNCTAD 
(2007; 46), these impediments include “(a) poor infrastructure, (b) high entry costs, (c) labour market 
constraints, (d) low investor protection, and (e) high taxes and a cumbersome tax system”.  On the 
tax front, UNCTAD (ibid) notes that a typical firm in sub-Saharan Africa pays the equivalent of 71% 
of its profits in taxes, some 15% percent higher than the second-highest rate, paid in Europe and 
Central Asia.   
 
In contrast, FDI, notably from the United States, has been a major trigger for economic growth in 
Ireland.  Indeed, relative to the size of the economy, Ireland has one of the highest levels of FDI 
inflows in the world. Whilst successive Irish governments have welcomed FDI (industrialization by 
invitation) since the 1950s, from the early 1970s onwards the government approach shifted towards a 
greater emphasis on selectivity and careful targeting, with pharmaceutical and electronics especially 
targeted as possessing promising opportunities. These industries were ideal for peripheral locations in 
that they were characterised by relatively low transportation costs and high growth rates 
(Braunerhjelm et al, 2000).  Furthermore, the US was targeted as the most probable market for such 
projects given the likely benefits that would accrue to US companies using Ireland as an export base 
within the EU. It is important to note that the promotion and assistance of particular sectors was 
well timed. For example, the extension by the Irish government of financial incentives to 
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internationally traded services just as they were about to grow in importance was a particularly timely 
intervention. Later, during the 1990s, industrial clusters in such sectors began to develop which 
involved linkages, spillover and sub–supply relationships with SMEs (see below). There was also a 
demonstration effect in operation, whereby the positive experiences of foreign investors in Ireland 
stimulated further FDI.  If strategic targeting and a more focused approach to FDI was a key part of 
the ‘success’ of FDI, this raises the question as to what sectors should small African countries now 
be targeting?11 
 
Whilst the high levels of FDI were largely brought about by a corporate–friendly environment 
offering the lowest corporate tax rate in the EU, it should be noted that these tax breaks had existed 
for decades with limited impact on economic success; indeed the corporate tax rate on manufactured 
exports was zero form 1957 to 1981, then 10% and later 12.5%. Furthermore, other European 
economies have had such rates without attracting such levels of US FDI – in part this may be 
because of the cultural links between Ireland and the US where many US citizens can trace their 
ancestry back to Ireland, a factor which cannot be replicated or seen as a ‘lesson’ for others.  In a 
similar vein, House and McGrath (2004) note that the emphasis on education and training and the 
favourable corporate tax environments were both already in place before the mid-1980s when the 
economy was still stagnant (ibid.). 
 
Of particular note was the recognition by the Irish government in the late 1970s and early 1980s that 
foreign transnationals were in effect branch plant operations and that the policy of heavily 
subsidising FDI was producing little in the way of wider spillovers for the economy. Because of this, 
policy began to adopt an even more selective approach to FDI, focusing more on high-tech and 
higher value added firms. Transnational firms’ motivations for FDI in Ireland shifted at this time, 
towards accessing the single market and access to skilled labour.   
 
It should be noted that problems and challenges remain and that the picture of FDI-induced 
‘transformation’ is challenged by some.  As Honohan and Walsh (2002) noted: “the huge profits 
recorded by the Irish affiliates have very little to do with the manufacturing activities being 
conducted in Ireland. The low labor shares in value added should not be interpreted as truly implying 
high economic productivity of the labor and physical capital employed by the enterprise in Ireland”.   
A key ‘lesson’, as we shall see below in more detail, would actually be that spillovers from FDI are not 
                                       
11 Here, the selection of target industries need to be realistic and related both to the country’s technological 
capabilities and world market conditions. The success of East Asian countries for example “owe a lot to the 
fact that they did not attempt to make too big a step” (Chang, 2006; 126). 
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generated automatically and that an industrial policy that targets and positions FDI is vital to ensure 
wider spillovers and to benefit the domestic sector.  The case is not anti-FDI per se; we recognise the 
value of high-quality FDI in assisting economic development. Rather, it needs to be stressed that this 
should not come at the expense of ignoring domestic firms (see below).  In a related vein, Buckley et 
al (2006) argue that the contribution of transnationals to the Irish economy can also be overestimated 
by failing to take account of the high level of imports (including payments for patents, royalties and 
other tangible inputs) and also repatriated profits.  Citing the work of Keating (2000), the authors 
show that “…sales amounted to €72 billion in 2004.  However, when imports of €43 billion and 
profit repatriation of €19 billion are deducted the direct contribution to GNP is only €10 billion” 
(Buckley et al 2006: 2).  
 
Attracting high-quality FDI and positioning it seems crucial. Here, lessons with FDI experiences in 
peripheral regions of the EU seems highly relevant in taking on board elements of ‘good practice’. 
This includes targeting strategic sectors and linking FDI to cluster development, building trust with 
local managers in order to try to upgrade local plants, undertaking sector specific research on the 
strengths and weaknesses of local industry, providing aftercare support, targeting financial assistance 
at specific upgrading needs (e.g. investment in R&D rather than general support), and the monitoring 
of performance (see Amin and Tomaney, 1995; Bailey et al 1999).  The Irish experience of selectively 
targeting FDI seems very relevant here and raises the issue more generally of using selective as well 
as horizontal industrial policy.12   
 
There was a general belief, hope and anticipation in Irish industrial policy circles that indigenous 
SMEs would ‘… grow from foreign firms through linkages and spillovers’ (Andreosso-O’Callaghan 
and Lenihan, 2006: 280).  This ‘spillover argument’ is often used by governments to justify subsidies 
for FDI, but such spillovers are not guaranteed. It is to this issue that we now turn, asking how 
successful (where they existed) were Irish Government policy interventions in achieving successful 
linkages and spillovers between incoming transnationals and indigenous (largely SME) firms?  This is 
significant as some see this link as a key element of the Irish ‘success story’. For example, Pike et al in 
their well-balanced review of local and regional development (2006; 233) suggest that: 
‘the role of industrial policy… seems important, with the Irish state and its governance institutions 
proving adept at providing the kinds of territorial assets that attract the sorts of TNCs that will 
                                       
12 See Bailey and Cowling (2007) who note that industrial policy in the US and Japan has involved both vertical 
measures in targeting new technologies and emerging industries, and horizontal measures to support all 
industries, suggesting that the current focus in Britain and the EU with the horizontal aspects of industrial 
policy has been largely misplaced. 
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contribute to development. Ireland may provide an example of a somewhat ‘strategic coupling’ 
between domestic and foreign owned firms…’. 
 
The wider FDI literature tells us that, if present, positive spillovers from transnationals can lead to 
increases in the productivity of domestic firms.  This can happen via three main routes: (1) 
demonstration effects; (2) competition effects, and; (3) labour market effects.  As noted, spillovers 
are not an automatic occurrence but are in essence driven by the characteristics of the host economy, 
such as its degree of economic development, its ability to assimilate imported technology and more 
generally its absorptive capacity (see Blomström and Kokko, 1996 and Blomström et al. 2000).  In 
this section we briefly highlight the key evidence regarding the prevalence such linkages and 
spillovers in Ireland.  Most notably, despite the rhetoric of ‘FDI-led adjustment’, there is significant 
evidence to suggest that the Irish economy operates according to a Lewis-type dualism “…with little 
relationship / interdependence between MNEs and (local enterprises) and each developing according 
to its own pattern” (Ugur and Ruane, 2004: 3). As such, each sector appears to have developed 
according to its own pattern. Such problems of ‘dualism’ of course remain a major problem in many 
developing economies; for example UNCTAD (2007;6) notes that in Africa, FDI is “…relatively 
volatile and tends to focus on extractive industries with very few linkages to the domestic economy”.   
 
In the Irish case, there is evidence from some sectors at least of improved linkages over time, such as 
in electronics (see Görg and Ruane, 2000; 2001), even if foreign (particularly large) firms have lower 
linkages – perhaps due to the necessary scale needed to supply such firms (ibid.).  For high-
technology sectors, the evidence of spillover effects is even more evident (Görg and Strobl, 2002; 
2003; Barry and Van Egeraat, 2008). Here, there is evidence to suggest that the presence of 
transnationals in high-technology sectors has had a “life-enhancing” effect on indigenous plants in 
Ireland, improved indigenous entry rates, and has improved links between manufacturers and 
components suppliers in sectors such as IT. Other contributions (Heanue and Jacobson, 2003; 
Forfás  2004; Lenihan and Sugden, 2008) have explored the issue of linkages in Ireland. Lenihan and 
Sugden (2008) argue that the National Linkages Programme introduced in 1985 was partly in 
response to criticism of an industrial policy approach by Irish government that relied on 
transnationals and was subsequently restructured by Enterprise Ireland with a focus surrounding the 
issue of the globalization of local supply industry.  This approach resulted in a move towards the 
building of supply networks and chains as opposed to actual direct local company linkages. Forfás 
(2004) in analyzing the impact of the National Linkages Programme argued that it stopped short of 
reaching its potential, while Heanue and Jacobson (2003) argued that there was some success up to 
the 1990s but thereafter the impact was insignificant.  In terms of more traditional sectors, Culliton 
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(1992: 31) argued that only a small proportion of potential linkages between foreign and traditional 
firms were being realized; and that “[i]n general,…. policy to promote industrial linkages has not 
lived up to its expectations. It is only a mild exaggeration to say that most of the newer foreign firms 
operate here as essentially an industrial enclave” (ibid.). The overall conclusion on the success or 
otherwise of linkages in Ireland is succinctly summed up by Ruane (2001); “it is hard to either totally 
prove or disprove” whether linkage policies have been successful. 
 
Related to this, how successful was the creation of clusters in Ireland?  A focus on creating sectoral 
and spatial clusters in Ireland really only began in earnest in the 1980s (Buckley and Ruane, 2006). 
Such efforts were focused around two key high technology sectors, namely, electronics and 
chemicals/pharmaceuticals.  More specifically, four segments of the electronics sector were targeted: 
microprocessors, software, computer products and printers.  In line with this strategy, some of the 
key players in these sectors, namely Intel and Microsoft, were attracted to establish operations in 
Ireland (ibid.).  With the location of such firms, and subsequently Hewlett Packard in printing, 
Ireland to all purposes had an “electronics hub” and the “spokes” were soon populated by dozens of 
smaller enterprises (ibid. 1620).  Ireland could thus be said to have been a significant beneficiary of 
the formation of clusters (Krugman, 1997); with the presence of the above-named firms contributing 
to the average share of US FDI in electronics to Ireland increasing to 27 per cent between 1994 and 
2001, compared to a rate of less than 12 per cent for Irish manufacturing as a whole (Buckley and 
Ruane, 2006). The two other key sectors where industrial clusters were created are the chemicals and 
pharmaceutical sectors, with these firms clustering primarily in the Cork region of Ireland.  However, 
in contrast to experience in the electronics sector, where production linkages between firms 
developed, this was not the case with the chemicals and pharmaceuticals clusters.   
 
In general, the empirical evidence on the impact of clusters in Ireland is, however, limited, with what 
evidence there is suggesting that there has been relatively little sectoral clustering between 
transnationals and local firms, at least in low-tech sectors and manufacturing overall (Gleeson et al, 
2005; Buckley and Ruane (2006). There does however, appear to have been some clustering between 
transnationals and local firms in certain high-tech sectors such as IT (ibid). The Irish government 
(Report of the Small Business Forum, 2006) has recognised, however, that as more low-value-added 
activities migrate to lower-cost countries, a greater proportion of GNP will have to be produced by 
indigenous firms (predominantly SMEs). Other reports commissioned by the Irish government (e.g. 
a study by Goodbody Economic Consultants, 2002) have also focused on the importance of 
entrepreneurship and more specifically on eliminating the barriers to entrepreneurship in Ireland.  
Whilst welcoming this focus, we would argue that this should have come much earlier in Ireland’s 
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development, and we see this as an important ‘lesson’ for other states as they look for lessons to be 
learned in terms of industrial policy trajectory.  
 
This review only serves to reiterate our point that a holistic industrial policy needs to account for the 
limitations and fragilities of FDI-led growth and hence also promote measures to grow domestic 
capacity, and to deliver a variety of growth ‘drivers’ for the economy.  It is accurate to say that the 
limitations of FDI-led growth have been increasingly (if belatedly) recognized. Ireland became 
vulnerable due to the downturn in the US economy, given its overwhelming reliance on US-based 
FDI.  Ireland faces increasing competition for FDI from emerging economies, and Ireland is no 
longer a cheap country in which to do business, due to rises in wages and raw material costs, and 
declining price competitiveness.  This has most recently been reflected in a wave of plant closures 
and downsizing by foreign transnationls.  We suggest that a more holistic approach to policy 
development at the outset could have avoided some of these problems, thereby enhancing economic 
development, a point which small, peripheral economies elsewhere may wish to note.13 
 
The discussion of this section will be seriously incomplete without reference to the fact that in the 
practice of industrial policy in East Asia, both Japan and South Korea discouraged FDI rather than 
to seek it .  Singh (1995) noted that among developing countries, the Republic of Korea was second 
only to India in its low reliance on FDI inflows (see UN, 1993 for figures).  In the view of World 
Bank economists, this discouragement was a self-imposed handicap, which was compensated for by 
the fact that both countries remained open to foreign technology through licensing and other means 
(East Asian Miracle, p.21).  Singh, however, noted that World Bank economists did not ask the 
question: if the governments of Japan and the Republic of Korea were as efficient and flexible in 
their economic policy as they themselves suggested (to account for their long-term, overall economic 
success), why did they persist with this apparently wrong-headed approach for so long? 
 
An alternative interpretation is that the approach was perhaps not so wrong-headed after all.  It was 
“functional” within the context of the overall industrial policies which the two countries were 
                                       
13 The role of large indigenous firms in the development process also needs to be noted here.  In many 
countries, such firms which are large by developing countries standards but rather puny in international terms 
are the spearheads of spreading technical change and productivity growth.  Amsden (1989) is the leading 
exponent of the critical role of large indigenous firms in late industrialization.  What is, therefore, required in 
industrial policy for developing countries is the right balance between the promotion of large and small firms.  
To illustrate this point, Indian industrial policy in the period 1950 to 1980 is an example of a policy which 
encouraged small firms at the expense of large firms in order primarily to safeguard employment.  Despite its 
good economic rationale, this policy is generally regarded as being a failure as it stopped the growth of large 
firms and thwarted their role in the development process. See further Joshi and Little (1994), (Ahluwalia (1992) 
and Singh (forthcoming).  
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pursuing.  First, it would have been difficult for MITI or the authorities of the Republic of Korea to 
use “administrative guidance” to the same degree with foreign firms as they were able to do with 
domestic ones.  Secondly, as UN (1993) rightly emphasized, there was a link between the national 
ownership of large firms and their levels of investment in research and development.  The Republic 
of Korea had, in relative terms, by far the largest expenditure on R&D among developing countries.14  
Korea’s performance in this area outstripped that of many developed countries- for example Belgium 
(1.7 per cent in 1987), Denmark (1.5 per cent in 1987) and Italy (1.2 per cent in 1987).  It was, of 
course, still below that of industrial super-powers, Japan (2.8 per cent in 1987) and Germany (also 2.8 
per cent in 1987). 
 
Thirdly, Freeman (1989) stressed another important advantage of the policy of mainly rejecting 
foreign investment as a means of technology transfer.  This, he argued, automatically placed on the 
enterprise the full responsibility for assimilating imported technology.  This was far more likely to 
lead to total system improvements and broader spill-overs than the “turn-key plant” mode of import 
or the foreign subsidiary mode.   
 
It is important to emphasize that Japan and South Korea’s rejection of FDI for long periods did not 
mean that these countries were not interested in importing foreign technology.  Quite the contrary.  
Japan after all has been attempting to obtain technology from abroad for a hundred years.  The 
reason why it did not favour FDI as a source of technology was that it was inter alia comparatively 
much more expensive than licensing. The latter was a policy pursued by Japan up to the 1980s, when 
under pressure from the US it began finally to dismantle such barriers and started to allow in FDI 
without requiring a Japanese joint venture partner (Bailey and Sugden, 2007). 
 
The above considerations may also be valid for those South Saharan African countries which prefer 
to import technology through licensing rather than through the medium of FDI. 
 
Indigenous Firms and Domestic Entrepreneurship 
 
Some commentators, such as Bailey et al (2007), have argued that the Irish government, on 
recognising the limitations of solely focusing on FDI as an engine of growth, also sought to develop 
indigenous small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) and entrepreneurship more generally. Whilst 
                                       
14 At 1.9 per cent of GNP in 1988, compared with 1.2 per cent for Taiwan Province of China (1988), 0.9 per 
cent for India (1986) and Singapore (1987), 0.5 per cent for Argentine (1988), 0.6 per cent for Mexico (1984) 
and 0.4 per cent for Brazil (1985) (UN, 1993). 
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acknowledging the merits of this opinion, we would also suggest that the focus on indigenous SMEs 
and entrepreneurship by Irish policymakers should have come much earlier.  Despite the fact, as 
outlined by Andreosso-O’Callaghan and Lenihan (2006: 282), that “…even as far back as 1979, some 
95 per cent of all manufacturing units could be classified as SMEs”, it is nevertheless quite 
astonishing that there was no formal focus by the Irish government on the small firms sector per se 
until 1994 with the publication of ‘The Task Force on Small Business Report’ (1994). This was 
followed a year later by the EU driven ‘Small Business Operational Programme’ (1995). The ‘SME 
story’ in Ireland is an indigenous one as a majority of all indigenous firms in Ireland are classified as 
SMEs.   
 
One could justifiably argue that the Irish government to a large degree overlooked the indigenous 
(largely SME sector) until the mid 1990s. As such, this represents a key policy ‘failure’ and should be 
avoided by small African states.   Admittedly, in the Irish case there were grants available to 
indigenous firms to start-up and expand - but the focus on indigenous and SME firms was over-
shadowed by the prime focus by the Irish government on FDI. This is evident in comments from 
various reviews of industrial policy over the decades; most notably the ‘Telesis Group’ (1980), which 
highlighted an over-emphasis on foreign industry.  The Culliton report noted above also emphasised 
the need to expand the indigenous sector, noting that “the focus instead must shift decisively to 
indigenous companies. The view of… Porter and his colleagues…is that in Ireland the shift has been 
“too little too late” and that there has not been a full commitment to the slow process of developing 
a broader base of indigenous firms” (p. 67). However, it was not until the ‘Task Force on Small 
Business Report’ published in 1994 that the focus on the SME sector by Irish policy makers truly 
began in earnest.   
 
Some of the problems facing small firms in Ireland are similar, albeit in a much more intense form, in 
Africa, most notably the issue of access to finance. As UNCTAD (2007; 15) notes, this is especially 
the case for the small domestic enterprises in the informal sector that represent the vast majority of 
firms. Indeed, it is thought that firms in sub-Saharan Africa fund between one half and three quarters 
of their new investments from their informal savings. In order to address this, microfinance systems 
have emerged in recent years in order to rectify some of the shortcomings of the financial system in 
Africa. 
 
More generally, Acs et al (2007) suggest that entrepreneurs in Ireland are held in high esteem, and that 
this has been beneficial for the economy. This is questionable. Indeed, Culliton (1992) highlighted 
“…the negative attitude towards enterprise that is prevalent in this country” (p. 22) and proceeded to 
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outline “…a deep-rooted prejudice against failure in business.  The stigma that attached to a failed 
enterprise very often inhibits the individual from ever trying again” (p. 22).  Perhaps it could be 
argued that such a negative attitude no longer exists.  However, ten years later from Culliton, 
Goodbody Economic Consultants (2002), although acknowledging an improvement, still noted that 
the “non-acceptance of ‘failure’, both on the part of financial institutions and the general public is 
still perceived to be an issue by Irish entrepreneurs” (p. iv).  They do however, admit that “these 
attitudes are somewhat at variance with recent international studies which indicate that the general 
public’s attitude towards entrepreneurship in Ireland is now highly favourable” (p. iv).   
 
The Role for Policy Evaluation 
 
In view of the types of market failures that are likely to arise in the SME sector noted above (e.g. the 
finance gap), a realistic route to help improve the efficiency of such markets is through the services 
provided by industrial development agencies. The extent to which development agencies in Ireland 
have produced the expected effects is an issue of significant and ongoing debate. One key issue that 
emerged in discussions (particularly pertaining to the 1990s) is that of agency duplication of services 
provided.
 
The Industrial Evaluation Unit (1999) found that around 39 per cent of firms that received 
support from more than one agency took up such support within the same time period. The prime 
lesson to be learned in this regard is that the support environment provided by government to firms 
needs to be clearly targeted and focused in its delivery. A clear underlying rationale for a specific type 
of intervention should be provided in all cases. 
 
One of the outcomes of EU funding in the case of Ireland is that over time there was increased 
pressure to engage in an evaluation of industrial policies (primarily to begin with for reasons of 
accountability). Indeed, guidelines from the European Commission (EC) as a result of Ireland being 
a Structural Fund beneficiary were definitely a key driving force behind the much greater emphasis 
placed on evaluation in Irish policy from the early 1990s onwards.  This is outlined by Andreosso O’ 
Callaghan and Lenihan (2006) in the context of the New EU Member States, but here we argue that 
the same issues are also pertinent to small African states. A number of possible strategies can be 
adopted in the context of industrial policy evaluation (options 1-3 are not mutually exclusive and a 
mixed approach is possible):  
 
1. Wait until pressure comes from outside to evaluate. In Ireland’s case this was from the EU.  In the 
case of the African economies, the impetus may come from agencies providing overseas 
development aid. This was the stance largely adopted by Ireland from around 1993 onwards;  
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2. Familiarise themselves with ‘best practice’ or at least ‘good practice’ evaluation frameworks and 
methodologies adopted internationally
 
(reflecting on the key issues learned) so that they are in a 
position to know ‘how’ (deciding on the methodological approach to be adopted is one of the key 
challenges for evaluators) to evaluate when requested to do so by external donors or organisations ; 
3. View evaluation as a useful tool in its own right. This would involve adopting a proactive approach 
whereby evaluation would take place at the three stages of the industrial policy process: policy 
formulation (ex–ante evaluation focusing on the market failure argument as a rationale for 
intervention and fundamental economic principles such as opportunity cost); policy implementation; 
and policy accountability (ex–post evaluation) (Rist 1995). Such an approach not only sees evaluation 
as something that must be undertaken due an external pressure (e.g. donor or funder) but rather sees 
evaluation as a worthwhile activity in terms of lessons to be learned that can subsequently be 
incorporated into future policy interventions.  There is no doubt that many would regard evaluation 
as a ‘luxury’ in African economies where resources are already scarce.  We would argue however, that 
if robust evaluations are carried out (which ask the right questions relating to issues such as 
deadweight, displacement15, multipliers and linkages) this may lead to improved future industrial 
policy interventions which in the long run could prove to be extremely cost effective and efficient.  
Clearly, this is an area that merits further investigation.   
 
Ireland should certainly not be regarded as a ‘role model’ in the context of industrial policy 
evaluation, having hovered around option 1 for most of the 1990s, although of late, it is certainly 
getting nearer to option 3. This is highlighted by Lenihan et al (2005; 14), who argue that “the 
methodological rigor of Irish industrial policy evaluations has been improving in recent years”.   It 
was not until some pressure came from the European Commission that Irish policy makers and 
academics alike truly began take industrial policy evaluation seriously. This is somewhat difficult to 
comprehend given that an interventionist approach to industrial policy has been a feature of the 
industrial policy stance by successive governments in Ireland since the 1950s, with the first grant to 
firms actually being awarded as far back as 1952. The degree of subsidy intervention in the Irish case 
is aptly summed up by Lenihan et al (2005) when they show that over the period 1980-2003, in the 
region of €5.5 billion was provided by the four Irish development agencies in the form of grant 
payments and equity investments.  The key point is that any policy intervention should bring about a 
level of ‘additionality’ in excess of what would have happened if no such intervention had taken place 
(i.e. explore the counter–factual, which involves trying to assess what would most likely have 
happened if no intervention had taken place).  In this regard, Storey (2000) argues that a prerequisite 
                                       
15 For a discussion of the concepts and estimation of deadweight and displacement, in the context of Ireland, 
see Lenihan (1999 and 2004) and Lenihan and Hart (2004). 
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to any evaluation is that clear objectives be specified. More precisely, he highlights the 
“…impossibility of conducting an evaluation in the absence of clearly specified objectives for the 
policy concerned” (p. 177).  This calls for a clearly defined set of policy objectives from the outset, 
and to allow for ‘trail and error’ as an important part of policy development. As UNCTAD (2007; 87) 
notes, referring in particular to East Asian experience: 
“A simple replication of the East Asian developmental State, even of there were such a thing, would 
not do.  As a matter of fact, there is no such thing as the East Asian model of a developmental State 
that could be recommended to Africa.  Indeed, the intrinsic differences among the Asian experiences 
underscore the importance of “trial and error” as an important ingredient of policy formulation and 
implementation in developmental States.  This process should benefit from constant monitoring and 
the feeding of the lessons learnt from monitoring into new policies to overcome earlier 
shortcomings”.  
Given some of the failures (as well as successes) of ‘traditional’ Japanese industrial policy (see Bailey 
and Sugden, 2007), some may conclude that Katz (1998) is correct in arguing that ‘development state’ 
policies should be avoided.  However, in a sense economies are always in a state of ‘development’; 
for us, the key is to adapt and tailor policies holistically to that stage of development. 
An additional challenge (as with all calls for evaluation) is who should actually carry out such 
evaluations. The follow-on question is who should evaluate the evaluators?  Clearly, in the face of the 
level of corruption and lack of resources to carry out some evaluations in some of the African 
economies, this issue is particularly pertinent.   
 
Concluding Thoughts 
 
As outlined in this paper, there are indeed some interesting similarities and lessons to be learned 
(both good and bad) by the smaller African economies from Irish industrial policy experiences.  Key 
amongst these is the concern expressed in this paper that industrial policy should not be seen purely 
in narrow terms, that is with a sole focus on attracting FDI.  We argue here that there is need for a 
more ‘holistic’ approach to economic development which inter-alia focuses on the development of 
domestic entrepreneurship and indigenous firm expansion more generally as well as emphasising the 
importance of other supply side factors (e.g. infrastructure; well functioning labour markets).  This 
more all-encompassing view of industrial policy and economic development may, it could be argued, 
take a longer time to materialise. This is a difficult position for the African economies to be faced 
with given the extremely high levels of poverty and deprivation witnessed in many of these small 
African economies.  We do however, argue that such a ‘holistic’ growth trajectory could lead to a 
more sustainable industrial development path, in contrast to the current situation in Ireland whereby 
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the recent down turn in the US economy has sent shock waves through the Irish economy given its 
(over)dependence on US firms.16  
 
This paper has provided some novel insights by providing a detailed comparison between Ireland 
and the small African economies.  As acknowledged in this paper, when comparisons in terms of 
industrial policy lessons to be learned have taken place, it tends to be vis-a-vis the East Asian 
experience (which, as seen above, undoubtedly also provides interesting economic development 
insights but with certain caveats).  The paper suggests that a very important contribution of the Irish 
model is its emphasis on corporatism rather than simply state direction in the operation of industrial 
policy.  The Irish model is also in a sense more democratic and has protected workers’ rights during 
the development process than the highly dirigisite East Asia model.  In relation to the small size of 
the African economies, the paper recommends regional integration and sufficient ODA for 
infrastructural development. 
 
We conclude here by making the point that some immediate actions are needed for example with 
respect to the financial system in the African economies.  A poorly functioning financial system will 
continue to keep investment at low levels.17 It is also important to bear in mind that the various small 
African economies each face their own industrial and economic development challenges, therefore 
we do not suggest a ‘one size fits all’ approach.  As outlined by UNCTAD (2007), referring to East-
Asian experience, the path to sustainable growth and development is derived from “a pragmatic mix 
of markets and state action, taking into account the country-specific development challenges” 
(UNCTAD, 2007; 61). It concludes: 
 
“The challenge for Africa (as for other developing countries), therefore, is not how to copy 
any model, but how to create “capitalisms” adaptable to the unique opportunities and 
development challenges in each country…” (UNCTAD, 2007; 88).   
 
 
 
 
                                       
16 Even as far back as 1989, there were 307 US companies located in Ireland.  Ten years later  in 1999, the 
number of US companies located in Ireland still stood at 288.  Whereas, the most recent year for which data is 
available (2006) shows that the total number of US companies has increased to 470 (with these 470 companies 
employing 95,515 people).  In fact, in 2001, the number of US companies reached a peak at 531.  This 
information is derived from the combined sources of UNCTAD WID (2005) Country Profile Ireland and 
various Annual Report from IDA Ireland (various years).   
17On the development of stock markets and banks in Africa, see further Singh (1999b) and Singh (forthcoming) 
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